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Combating In-Work Poverty in Continental Europe: 
An Investigation Using the Belgian Case 
 
Recent studies find in-work poverty to be a pan-European phenomenon. Yet in-work poverty 
has come to the fore as a policy issue only recently in most continental European countries. 
Policies implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom, most notably in-work 
benefit schemes, are much discussed. This article argues that if it comes to preventing and 
alleviating poverty among workers, both the policy options and constraints facing Continental 
European policymakers are fundamentally different from those facing Anglo-Saxon 
policymakers. Consequently, policies that work in one setting cannot be simply emulated 
elsewhere. We present micro-simulation derived results for Belgium to illustrate some of 
these points. Policy options discussed and simulated include: higher minimum wages, 
reductions in employee social security contributions, tax relief for low-paid workers, and the 
implementation of a stylised version of the British Working Tax Credit. The latter measure 
has the strongest impact on in-work poverty but in settings where wages are compressed, as 
in Belgium, a severe trade-off between coverage and budgetary cost presents itself. The 
article concludes that looking beyond targeted measures to universal benefits and support for 
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Introduction 
Combating in-work poverty is  an issue that affects all of Europe,  including the countries 
where the fight against unemployment and poverty out of work remains the bigger challenge 
(Andreβ  and  Lohmann,  2008;  OECD,  2009;  Eurofound,  2010).  There  already  exists  a 
substantial literature on policies to combat in-work poverty in Anglo-Saxon countries, in part 
because  of  a  longer  standing  awareness  about  this  issue.  In  the  United  States,  the  1993 
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) turned it into the country‟s pre-eminent 
anti-poverty  program  for  families  of  working  age.  The  EITC,  in  combination  with  other 
policy reforms and several increases in the minimum wage, produced some striking results, 
including marked increases  in  labour market  participation and declines in  poverty among 
some  segments  of  the  population,  especially  single-parent  households  (Hotz  and  Scholz, 
2003; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).  
 
The United Kingdom has also implemented and extended several schemes, culminating in the 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) of 2003 (Brewer et al., 2006). Elsewhere in Europe, concern for 
the  „working  poor‟  has  emerged  as  a  policy  issue  only  recently.  The  policy  solutions 
implemented  in  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  garner  considerable  interest. 
Several European countries have contemplated introducing Anglo-Saxon-style tax credits, or 
are presently doing so. Interestingly, some countries have already backed away from the idea 
or implemented a watered-down version, perhaps to show their commitment to „Third Way‟ 
or „Active Welfare State‟ ideas. Examples here include the „Prime Pour l‟Emploi‟ (PPE) and 
the  Revenue  de  Solidarité  Active  (rSa)  in  France,  the  „Combination  Credit‟  in  the 
Netherlands, and a “Low Wage Tax Credit” in Belgium (Marx and Verbist, 2008a). As we 
will  illustrate  for  Belgium  in  some  detail,  the  Belgian  tax  credit  only  exhibits  a  faint 
resemblance to the EITC or the WTC. This is also the case for the French and Dutch schemes. 
The  UK  Working  Tax  Credit,  to  be  replaced  by  the  Universal  Credit,  remains  the  most 
important measure of its kind in Europe, both in terms of scope and budget. Interest remains 
strong, in the public debate and in the academic literature (Kenworthy, 2011).  
 
This brings us to the core theme of this article. When it comes to preventing and alleviating 
poverty among workers, both the policy options and constraints facing Continental European 
policymakers  are  different  from  those  facing  Anglo-Saxon  policymakers.  To  start  with, 
effective  minimum  wages  are,  generally  speaking,  already  comparatively  high  relative  to 
median wages, suggesting a more limited scope for policy action on this front. At the same 
time,  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  are  more  significant  in  many  Continental 
European countries, making it more likely that workers are „taxed into poverty‟. The potential 
scope  for  improving  worker‟s  living  standard  through  tax  relief  and  reductions  in  social 
security contributions may be more substantial for that reason.  
 
The  political  and  governance  constraints  are  also  fundamentally  different  in  the 
predominantly  Bismarckian  Continental  European  settings  (Palier,  2010;  Streeck,  2009). 
Within Bismarckian social protection systems there are specific limits to the extent to which 4 
need-based  elements  can  be  introduced.  While,  for  example,  targeted  social  contribution 
reductions  may  make  sense  from  a  poverty  reduction  viewpoint,  the  primacy  of  the 
contributory and equivalence principles may limit the extent to which this is feasible. And 
while social policy is predominantly government controlled in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
allowing for coordination with tax and other income policies (like minimum wages), social 
security and wage setting remain largely the prerogative of the social partners in Continental 
Europe. This implies that the coordination of wage, social transfer and tax policies may be 
more difficult and that poverty alleviation has to be reconciled with other considerations and 
interests. 
 
This article considers the specific policy issues in relation to combating in-work poverty in 
Continental Europe. Specifically, this article will look at what higher minimum wages and 
(targeted) tax reductions can do to reduce in-work poverty. It also considers the potential 
impact of a UK-style tax credit. A general discussion is complemented with microsimulation 
analyses for Belgium that serve to illustrate the points made.  
 
Belgium  represents  an  interesting  case  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  and  as  we  will 
document in more detail below, Belgium has one of the lowest in-work poverty rates in the 
European  Union  with  around  5  per  cent  of  workers  living  in  financial  poverty  in  2008, 
relative to the 60 per cent of median equivalent household income threshold. Nevertheless, in-
work poverty accounts for about a third of the population at working age living in poverty. 
Around 50 per cent of working poor households are households with children. 
 
Belgium also has a comparatively compressed wage structure. According to the OECD‟s data 
base on earnings, Belgium has just about the lowest incidence of relatively low-paid work in 
the OECD area (OECD, 2010). Less than 6 per cent of Belgium‟s workers earn less than 67 
per cent of median earnings. The OECD26 average is 16 per cent. At the same time, taxes and 
social security contributions on wages are on the highest side of spectrum (Immervoll, 2007). 
In  that  sense,  it  combines  two  contextual  features  that  make  many  of  the  Continental 
European  welfare  states  substantially  different  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  that  have 
received significantly more attention in the literature. That is not to say that Belgium is a 
„typical‟ Continental European case. While low-paid work is less prevalent in countries like 
Belgium  or  France,  Germany  is  a  case  where  low-paid  work  is  as  frequent,  relatively 
speaking, as in the United Kingdom or Ireland. In Poland and some of the Baltic countries it 
appears to be even more widespread. Similarly, in terms of the overall tax burden put on 
workers,  including  social  security  contributions,  the  picture  across  Continental  Europe  is 
actually quite varied. What makes Belgium interesting, we would argue, is that on two key 
dimensions – wage compression and taxation – it is at the extreme end of the spectrum and for 
that reason particularly worth looking at. 
 
The article starts with a discussion of the data, definitions and methods. It continues with a 
brief sketch of the extent and specific nature of in-work poverty in Continental European 
welfare  states  and  in  Belgium  in  particular.  The  focus  then  turns  to  an  examination  of 
alternative policy options: a) raising minimum wages and effective wage floors; b) reductions 5 
in personal income taxes and social security contributions for low wage workers and c) the 
introduction  of  the  UK-style  tax  credit.  A  final  section  discusses  the  key  elements  of  a 
suitable policy mix for combating in-work poverty in Continental Europe. 
 
 
Data and methods 
For this paper we use EU-SILC for 2006 to identify those in work the previous year, and 
living in a household with a total disposable household income below the commonly used 60 
per  cent  of  median  equivalent  income  threshold,  using  the  OECD  modified  equivalence 
scale.
1 We use microsimulation modelling for the empirical assessment of policy options in 
Belgium. This technique is particularly well-suited to investigate the consequences of policy 
changes as these interact with the existing tax-benefit structure. The method has already been 
used to study the impact of alternative policies for combating in -work poverty (see e.g. 
Sutherland (2001) for the U.K., Müller and Steiner (2008) for Germany, Figari (2009) for 
Southern European countries, Formby et al. (2010) for the U.S.). 
 
We  use  the  microsimulation  model  MISIM  (see  Verbist,  2003).  MISIM 
(MicroSImulationModel) is a static tax-benefit model designed to evaluate policy alternatives 
in  the  field  of  social  security  and  personal  income  taxation.  The  model  covers  personal 
income taxes, social security contributions and part of social benefits. MISIM can provide as 
output both the budgetary consequences of policy measures  as well as the  impact on the 
income distribution and poverty.  
 
Simulation models have some inherent limitations. This method uses empirical data that are 
either obtained by means of surveys or from administrative sources. As such, the accuracy of 
the results depends on the quality of the data (e.g. adequate information about the relevant 
socio-economic characteristics, a sufficiently large sample). Our model runs on the Belgian 
EU-SILC 2006 survey data for a representative sample of the Belgian population. We use the 
Belgian version rather than the uniformed EUROSTAT version, because it contains a number 
of more detailed variables required to simulate the tax-benefit system accurately. Apart from 
socio-economic characteristics corresponding to the moment of the interview (2006), EU-
SILC-2006 captures incomes and income-relevant variables such as labour market status for 
the entire year 2005. As a consequence, the presented figures pertain to the Belgian situation 
in 2005. While in a number of countries concern has been raised about the data quality of the 
EU-SILC (see e.g. Hauser, 2008), the available evidence suggests that the Belgian component 
of EU-SILC performs relatively well at both internal and external coherence (Lusyne, 2007). 
The sample contains 14,329 individuals in 5,860 households, and is representative for the 
Belgian population living in private households. 
 
                                                 
1   The modified OECD equivalence scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the first household member aged fourteen 
or over; 0.5 to each additional household member aged  fourteen or more and 0.3 to every member 
younger than fourteen. 6 
The model MISIM assumes full take-up of benefits and no tax evasion. As the simulations in 
this article basically relate to personal income taxes and social contributions, the issue of non 
take-up is not relevant here; moreover, means-tested benefits make up only a small fraction of 
social benefits in Belgium. Tax evasion may be an issue, but the possible extent of it is 
unknown and cannot be estimated due to lack of information. However, as documented in 
Verbist (2003), the Belgian personal tax system is well covered by MISIM, and outcomes are 
in line with administrative tax information. Consequently, MISIM based simulations can be 
considered sufficiently reliable first-order estimates. 
 
In this article, only first-order effects are considered, so no account is taken of possible labour 
supply effects. Some microsimulation studies do model the behavioural response in terms of 
labour supply and find that the effects of potential second round effects are relatively limited 
(see e.g. Bargain and Orsini, 2007, who use EUROMOD to model the introduction of an 
Anglo-Saxon type of working tax credits in three European countries). 
 
Previous  microsimulation  studies  reveal  the  existence  of  a  trade-off  between  the  work 
incentive and the redistributive effects of measures aiming to „make work pay‟. While efforts 
targeted at low-paid workers may make perfect sense from the perspective of increasing work 
incentives, this does not imply that the redistributive effects are as desirable as one might 
want them to be. Many low-paid workers potentially affected by financial disincentives are 
not at the bottom of the distribution in terms of their disposable income at the household 
level; in many instances they are in fact relatively high up the household income distribution. 
Efforts  to  remove  potential  dependency  traps  may  effectively  involve  redistribution  to 
households  relatively  high  up  the  income  distribution.  Hence,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
measures  on  both  fronts  crucially  depends  on  their  design  (and  particularly  whether  the 
measures are aimed at individuals with low earnings or in low-income households) and also 
on  the  interactions  with  the  tax-benefit  systems  in  place  (Sutherland,  2001;  Müller  and 
Steiner, 2008; Figari, 2009). 
 
 
In-work poverty in Continental Europe and Belgium 
Gauging from the EU Social Inclusion Indicators database derived from EU-SILC, the extent 
of in-work poverty in 2008 ranges from a low of four to five per cent in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, to around six to eight per cent in Austria, Germany and France, and over twelve 
per cent in Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
 
In-work poverty is clearly significant across the EU. It is quite clear that the extent of in-work 
poverty is not reflective of how widespread relatively low-paid work is, defined as 2/3 of the 
median monthly wage. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, earnings are considerably more 
dispersed and relatively low-paid work more widespread (Blau and Kahn, 2008; Lucifora and 
Salverda, 2008). Yet, with poverty rates for workers at six per cent in Ireland and nine per 7 
cent  in  the  United  Kingdom,  in-work  poverty  is  not  more  widespread  than  elsewhere  in 
Europe. 
 
In framing effective policy responses it is essential to understand that low-paid work and in-
work poverty are largely separate phenomena. Various studies have demonstrated that the 
overlap between low pay and poverty is weak – in the order of five to ten per cent in most 
industrialised economies (Nolan and Marx, 2000). This is because poor households generally 
do not contain an employee, whether low-paid or not, while most low-paid workers live in 
households  with more  than  one  earner.  A  crucial  influence  is  thus the extent to  which the 
household relies on the earnings of this low-paid worker. Particularly for low-paid women and 
young people, their earnings most often constitute a secondary or even tertiary source of income 
for the household. In some cases, accepting a low-paid job helpsto lift household income above 
the  poverty  threshold  (Gardiner  and  Millar,  2006).  Low-paid  workers  who  are  not  primary 
earners are often reasonably high up the income distribution.  
 
While the low-paid do still comprise a substantial proportion of the working poor, many – 
often a majority – of the working poor are not below conventional low pay thresholds. The 
core of the working poor consists of workers who are sole earners and have a family to 
support. Even a moderately well-paid job may not suffice to meet household income needs, 
depending on the extent of those needs  and the other sources of income available to the 
household. 
 
What matters is the combined labour market position of household members. Having only one 
earner in the household has become a poverty risk in an era in which the average living 
standard, and hence the relative poverty threshold, is increasingly determined by the dual 
earner living standard. This helps to explain why in-work poverty is pervasive across Europe, 
and why its extent does not simply reflect the size of the low-wage sector. In-work poverty is 
more strongly associated with the prevalence of single-earnership than it is with the size of the 
low-paid work force, In-work poverty is thus a problem associated with a multiplicity of 
institutional factors (e.g. labour market regulation, child care support, tax incentives etc.) that 
influence a household‟s capacity for acquiring multiple incomes in an era in which multiple 
household incomes are usually required to attain a decent standard of living. Lohmann and 
Marx (2008), comparing the EU-15 countries, argue that these institutional factors are most 
favourably  aligned  in  the  Nordic  countries  and  least  favourably  in  the  South,  while  the 
institutional  constellations  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  Continental  European  countries  have 
mixed and sometimes contradictory effects.  
 
In Belgium, the labour market and the welfare state remain to some extent geared towards the 
breadwinner model (Marx and Verbist, 2008b). With an implicit breadwinner bias still present 
in wage-setting institutions and elements of labour market regulation, the size of the low-
wage labour market remains comparatively limited. Job security protection remains elaborate, 
derived  social  security  rights  remain  substantial  and  the  tax  system  supports  the  sole 
breadwinner  model  to  some  extent.  At  the  same  time,  however,  childcare  provisions  for 
working  parents  are  extensive,  making  Belgium  a  case  in  point  of  what  has  been  called 8 
“optional  familialism”,  where  the  care-giving  family  is  supported,  but  at  the  same  time 
families  are also  given the option of being (at  least  partially) unburdened from  childcare 
responsibilities (Leitner, 2005).  
 
Table  1  shows  the  extent  and  structure  of  in-work  poverty  in  Belgium.  It  is  primarily  a 
phenomenon affecting prime-age workers. There is no strong gender bias, with male and 
female workers equally affected. Workers of all education levels are confronted with in-work 
poverty, albeit those with lower education levels relatively more strongly. The overlap with 
low-pay employment is relatively limited. There is a strong association with work intensity in 
that full-year, full-time workers are considerably less likely to be confronted with in-work 
poverty  than  part-year,  part-time  workers.  Particularly  important  is  the  incidence  and 
distribution of in-work poverty across household configurations. Employed lone parents and 
single-earner couples with dependent children are most at risk of poverty. Single persons have 
a lower poverty risk, but because of their population share they constitute a significant share 
of  poor  workers.  Among  dual-earner  households  without  children,  in-work  poverty  is 
virtually non-existent. Yet a small but significant proportion of dual earner households with 
dependent children have insufficient combined earnings to live free from financial poverty. 
Hence, the population of workers confronted with poverty is a heterogeneous one, which is 
clearly important when it comes to framing policies.  
 9 
Table 1.  Profile  of  the  working  poor  in  Belgium,  2005  (Poverty  line  at  60  %  of  median 
equivalent income). 
    at risk of poverty rate  distribution of all workers  distribution of poor workers 
All    3.2  100.0  100.0 
Gender         
  male  3.1  54.5  52.7 
  female  3.4  45.5  47.3 
Age         
  16-24  6.1  8.1  15.7 
  25-54  3.1  83.6  81.0 
  55-64  1.3  8.3  3.4 
Education level         
  low  6.3  16.4  31.9 
  middle  3.2  38.0  37.5 
  high  2.2  45.6  30.6 
Type of contract       
  permanent  2.3  89.7  65.8 
  temporary  10.3  10.3  34.2 
Work intensity 
  full year full time  1.5  69.8  33.0 
  full year part time  3.4  19.1  19.8 
  part year full time  12.1  8.1  30.1 
  part year part time  17.5  3.2  17.1 
Wage level 
  low paid  18.0  5.0  29.4 
  not low paid  2.3  95.0  70.6 
Position in the household       
  reference person  3.9  57.0  69.0 
  partner  2.1  31.8  20.4 
  other  3.1  11.2  10.6 
Household type       
one earner  7.4  32.7  74.6 
  single  4.1  13.8  17.6 
  lone parent  10.4  3.6  11.7 
  couple, no children  5.9  6.7  12.1 
  couple, children  12.8  5.2  20.6 
  other, no children  7.2  2.4  5.2 
  other, children  24.4  1.0  7.4 
two or more earners  1.2  67.3  25.4 
  couple, no children  0.9  16.4  4.7 
  couple, children  1.1  33.2  11.7 
  other, no children  1.1  10.6  3.8 
  other, children  2.3  7.1  5.2 
Note: Workers are defined as those whose main activity status was „in work‟ (full time or part time) for at least one month 
during the reference year and who earned a strictly positive income from employment, excluding self-employment. Low pay 
is defined as earning less than 2/3 of the median gross hourly wage for all employees. 
Source: own calculations on the basis of SILC2006. 
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Increasing minimum wages 
Minimum wages in general 
The number of European countries with a national wage, set by law or through collective 
bargaining  at  the  national  level,  has  increased  over  the  past  two  decades  (Vaughan-
Whitehead, 2010). The early 1990s saw the introduction of minimum wages in the formerly 
Communist  countries  that  are  now  part  of  the  European  Union.  The  United  Kingdom 
introduced a national minimum wage in 1999, Ireland introduced one a year later and Austria 
in 2009. In 2010, nineteen Member States of the European Union had a national minimum 
wage, set by government, often in cooperation with or on the advice of the social partners, or 
by the social partners themselves in a national agreement.
2 In a number of countries where no 
national minimum wage exists, like in Germany and the Nordic co untries, workers are 
protected by collective agreements set at the industry or firm level. These vary considerably in 
coverage and in level. 
 
Both EUROSTAT and OECD data show increases in real minimum wages in all but a few EU 
countries. The most significant real term increases have by and large  occurred in the EU12 
countries. However, these real increases translate into a more diverse picture if it comes to 
relative trends. Mostly on the basis of Eurostat data complemented with national sources, 
Vaughan-Whitehead (2010) finds, for the period 1995 -2007, declines relative to average 
wages in seven out of twenty EU countries included in the study, and relative rises elsewhere. 
Over a shorter period (2000-2005), the OECD finds a similarly mixed picture. Less is known 
about actual coverage and enforcement of minimum wages (Immervoll, 2007). 
 
Do higher minimum wages still have much to offer as a strategy for tackling in-work poverty? 
The argument that minimum wages destroy jobs or stifle job growth is as old as the notion of 
the minimum wage itself, but it is also now argued that they have become a particularly 
ineffective if not counter-productive policy instrument in the fight against poverty due to the 
combined  impact  of  the  demand  shift  against  the  less -skilled  and  the  demise  of  the 
breadwinner  model  (Iversen  and  Wren,  1998;  Esping-Andersen  et  al.,  2002).  Female 
employment rates remain comparatively low in many European countries, and this could be 
partly because institutionally compressed wages limit the expansion of suitable employment. 
This is not the place to review the extensive literature on the employment effects of minimum 
wages and wage-setting institutions but research generally shows that the minimum wage 
floors  as  they  actually  exist  tend  to  have  limited  demonstrable  effects  on  employment, 
although particular groups like young people or women may be more substantially affected 
(Dolado et al., 1996; 2000; OECD, 1998; 2004; Kenworthy, 2004). 
 
                                                 
2   The EU countries with a national minimum wage, set by government of by a generally binding collective 
agreement include: Austria, Belgium, Spain, Estonia, Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and the United 
Kingdom.. 11 
A  potentially  more  powerful  argument  against  employing  minimum  wages  or  equivalent 
strategies as a strategy against in-work poverty is that because of the very limited overlap 
between low pay and poverty, any policy aimed at improving the earnings of the low-paid 
will directly benefit only a minority of poor households (Nolan and Marx, 2000). Studies 
suggest that even in those cases where the overlap between low pay and household poverty is 
the  greatest,  as  is  the  case  in  the  United  States,  increases  in  the  minimum  wage  have  a 
relatively limited impact on poverty or income inequality and a substantial spill-over to the 
non-poor  (see,  for  example,  Horrigan  and  Mincey  1993;  Neumark  and  Wascher,  1997; 
Formby  et  al.,  2005;  2010).  Similarly,  Gosling  (1996)  and  Sutherland  (2001)  found  the 
potential poverty-reducing effect of the national minimum wage in the UK context to be very 
small.  
 
Wage-setting institutions and minimum wage protection in Belgium 
Wage setting in Belgium is a matter in which unions and employers have a large degree of 
autonomy. Although an initial round of bargaining at the national level sets the parameters 
every two years, actual wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, where collective 
agreements are negotiated in over one hundred parity commissions, some covering specific 
subsectors with only a few hundred workers. Another notable feature is Belgium‟s automatic 
wage indexation system, which guarantees  that wages  are automatically  adjusted to  price 
increases.  There  is  no  statutory  minimum  wage  in  Belgium,  but  there  is  a  nationwide, 
collectively agreed-upon minimum wage. This “headline” minimum wage serves more of a 
benchmark purpose than anything else: it constitutes the absolute bottom line of the wage 
structure. “Real” minimum wages (i.e., pay scales for the youngest, least qualified and least 
experienced  workers)  are  negotiated  at  the  industry  level.  These  tend  to  be  considerably 
higher  than  the  nationwide  minimum  wage.  According  to  OECD  calculations,  the  gross 
earnings of a full-time Belgian minimum-wage worker amounted to 40 per cent of the average 
European gross wage in 2005, compared to 35 per cent for the United Kingdom (Immervoll, 
2007).  Also  according  to  OECD  data,  and  indicating  that  effective  wage  floors  are  even 
higher comparatively speaking, the incidence of low-paid work amounted to around six per 
cent  of  full-time  workers  versus  21  per  cent  in  the  United  Kingdom.
3  With  such a  low 
incidence of low-paid work among full-time workers, Belgium stands out as the country with 
just about the most compressed wage distribution at the lower en d of the spectrum in the 
OECD area.  
 
The effects of minimum wages on poverty 
Despite its relatively high level, the minimum wage is insufficient to guarantee a poverty-free 
existence. Table 2 compares the gross minimum wage and net income at minimum wage level 
to the 60 per cent of median equivalent income poverty threshold, for various household 
                                                 
3   The incidence of low pay refers to the share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings. 12 
types. The gross minimum wage is only sufficient to keep a single person out of poverty. It is 
insufficient for all other household types, especially when there are dependent children.  
 
Table 2.  Comparison  of  the  monthly  minimum  wage  for  full-time  workers  (MW)  levels 
relative to the poverty line, one earner households, Belgium 2005. 
   Gross MW (1)  Net income at MW (2)  60% poverty line 
1 adult, no children  1161  951  828 
2 adults, no children  1161  1072  1242 
1 adult, 2 children  1161  1034  1324 
2 adults, 2 children  1161  1114  1738 
(1) gross MW = legal MW (22 years old employee) without holiday pay and end-of-year premium 
(2) net income at MW = gross MW – social security contributions + work bonus - tax prepayment 
 
The essential A key factor here is that over the past decades, average living standards, and 
hence relative poverty thresholds, have been pushed up not only by real wage growth but also 
by  the  proliferation  of  dual  earnership.  Consequently,  the  minimum  wage  has  had  great 
difficulty  keeping pace  with  rising living standards. The increases in  the minimum  wage 
required to keep a sole breadwinner household with children relying on it above the poverty 
threshold would have had to significantly exceed the rise in average wages. Consequently, the 
increases  in  the  minimum  wage  required  to  eliminate  in-work  poverty  in  most  European 
welfare states are now quite substantial.  
 
Using microsimulation, we evaluate the distributional and poverty-reducing impact of some 
very substantial minimum wage increases. First, we simulate a scenario where all workers are 
paid at least the current minimum wage, in order to rule out possible effects of undeclared 
employment or mismatches between reported values for income and working hours. Then 
three alternative scenarios are simulated: the minimum wage is lifted to 110, 120 and 130 per 
cent  of  its  current  level.  For  each  person  employed  at  a  wage  lower  than  the  respective 
threshold, gross employment income is brought up to the level where all hours worked are 
remunerated  at  the  higher  hourly  wage.  The  microsimulation  model  MISIM  allows 
calculating  the  resulting  net  income,  taking  into  account  the  features  of  the  Belgian  tax-
benefit  system,  such  as  eligibility  for  wage  subsidies  or  tax  credits,  and  the  progressive 
structure of income taxation. This means that first-round effects are included, while second-
round effects that may occur following the introduction of an elevated minimum wage are not 
accounted for.
4 The effect of the minimum wage increases on the relative poverty threshold is 
taken into account. 
 
                                                 
4   Possible effects might include an adjustment of the entire wage structure to the new benchmark, or the 
pressure of increased labour costs on employment rates. 13 
Figure 1.  Average gain in equivalent household income for different minimum wage increase 
scenarios; average over all individuals (bars, left axis) and percentage of individuals 
living in a beneficiary household (markers, right axis) by decile, Belgium 2005. 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of MISIM and SILC2006. 
 
Table 3.  Poverty impact of raising minimum wages to 110%, 120% and 130% of the current 
level, Belgium 2005 (Poverty line at 60 % of median equivalent income, recalculated 
for each scenario). 
  Baseline 








Poverty line (expressed as a % of 
baseline) 
100  100  100  101  101 
All individuals at active age  12.41  12.36  12.29  12.42  12.48 
Employees           
all  3.25  3.10  3.03  3.06  3.00 
full time  2.86  2.74  2.65  2.66  2.62 
part time  4.72  4.45  4.44  4.46  4.39 
full time 12 months  1.52  1.41  1.38  1.44  1.40 
Children  15.10  14.97  14.82  15.10  15.10 
Note: Employees are defined as those whose main activity status was „in work‟ (full time or part time) for at least one month 
during the reference year and who earned a strictly positive income from employment, excluding self-employment. Full-time 
employees are those who have spent at least one month in full-time employment during the reference year and a larger 
number of months full-time than part-time, part-time employees have worked at least one month in part-time employment 
and a larger number of months part-time than full-time. Children are defined as all individuals aged 16 or younger. 
Source: own calculations on the basis of MISIM and SILC2006. 
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Figure 1 presents the average gain in equivalent household income resulting from each of the 
three  alternative  scenarios  in  comparison  to  the  baseline  scenario  (where  every  working 
individual earns at least the minimum hourly wage). The bars express the averages over the 
total population, while the markers show the percentage of individuals living in a household 
that benefits from the policy measure.  
 
The concentration of extra income is highest in the middle of the income distribution: average 
gains are highest in the fourth and fifth decile (left axis). This distribution is largely driven by 
the proportion of beneficiaries per decile (right axis). Only 3 (+10%-scenario) to 5 (+30%-
scenario) per cent of individuals situated in the first decile live in a household with a worker 
benefiting from  the wage increase.  The  net  gain  for  those  who actually benefit  from the 
respective measures is comparable or even higher in the lowest deciles than for those higher 
up the income distribution. But because relatively few workers are to be found in the lower 
deciles, the average gain is higher towards the middle of the household income distribution. 
This distributional pattern points to the marginal impact of these measures in terms of poverty 
reduction (see Table 3). Persons at risk of poverty are situated in the lowest deciles, where the 
percentage of gainers remains relatively limited. At the same time, about 70 per cent of the 
employees at risk of poverty are not low-paid which means they are not benefiting from a 
minimum wage increase. 
 
About  3  (+10%-scenario)  to  6.5  (+30%-scenario)  per  cent  of  Belgian  employees  would 
benefit from a net nominal gain in disposable income of just over €1500 per year on average 
over the different scenarios. In gross terms, this corresponds to a rise of about €2600 per year. 
The increase in labour costs for the employer would exceed this amount by a substantial 
margin because of the additional employer social insurance contributions
5. Note that this is 
yet  another  reason  why  the  policy  option  of  raising  minimum  wages  is  particularly 
constrained  in  many  Continental  European  countries  –  non-wage  costs  in  the  form  of 
additional social security contributions by employers are significant. According to OECD 
calculations  for  2005,  payroll  taxes  and  employer  contributions  at  minimum  wage  level 
amounted to around fifteen to seventeen per cent in Belgium, France and the Netherlands, and 
to around 30 per cent or more in Spain, Italy and Greece (Immervoll, 2007). By contrast, in 
Ireland and Britain the additional cost to employers at minimum wage level was around seven 
to eight per cent. 
 
These  calculations  for  Belgium  suggest  that  a  minimum  wage  increase  would  come  at  a 
substantial additional cost to employers, with a very limited direct impact on poverty and with 
the bulk of the gains going to middle income families. Hence we can safely conclude that 
raising minimum wages as an isolated measure is relatively ineffective and cost-inefficient as 
a way to reduce poverty among workers.  
 
                                                 
5   Assuming that the cost it is not shifted to the worker as afurther round effect. 15 
Reducing social security contributions and taxes on low wages 
The taxation of low wages 
OECD tax calculations for 2005 (Immervoll, 2007) show that the average tax rate on full-time 
minimum wages is considerable in most Continental European countries. Personal income 
taxes and employees social contributions amount to 18.8 per cent in Belgium, 17.6 per cent in 
France, and even 23.8 per cent in the Netherlands. For Ireland and the United Kingdom, the 
figures are 3.8 per cent and 11 per cent. 
 
These high levels indicate that in many countries there is still substantial scope for improving 
the income position of low-wage households through cuts in employee social contributions 
and  personal  income  taxes.  Many  countries  have  effectively  introduced  reductions  of 
employees‟ social contributions on low wages, thus increasing the income progressivity of 
social contributions and taxes (Immervoll, 2007). The prime objective here, however, has not 
been to alleviate in-work poverty but to increase work incentives, particularly the net pay-off 
to making the transition from dependence on a social assistance or unemployment benefit to a 
low-paid  job.  The  question  we  are  interested  in  is  whether  such  reductions  also  help  in 
reducing or preventing in-work poverty. 
 
The taxation of low wage workers in Belgium 
Belgium can be noted for its comparatively high level of taxes on wages. Belgium not only 
has one of the highest tax burdens on average and higher wages in the OECD area, but on low 
wage levels as well (Immervoll, 2007). Going back to Table 2, we see that with the gross 
minimum wage insufficient to guarantee a life free from financial poverty (except for single 
persons),  taxation  (personal  income  taxes  and  employee  social  security  contributions) 
aggravates  the  situation.  Over  the  last  years,  Belgium  has  made  efforts  to  reduce  its  tax 
burden on wages, especially for those at the lower end of the income distribution. With the 
2001 tax reform, a general tax cut was introduced along with a refundable low-wage tax 
credit.  This  tax  credit,  amounting  at  its  peak  in  2005  to  €540  per  year,  was  applied  to 
individual net taxable income from employment before any family-related taxation rules were 
taken into account. Structural reductions of employee social insurance contributions for low-
wage earners were also introduced, as well as a variety of reductions in employers‟ social 
insurance contributions. One of the more recent measures intended to increase the net wages 
of low-wage workers is the “Work Bonus”. This was introduced in January 2005, gradually 
replacing the structural reductions of employee contributions and the low-wage tax credit. The 
employee social security contribution reduction can amount to €150 per month for a low-
wage worker; it is tapered away as the wage level increases. Contrary to the low-wage tax 
credit, it also takes into account the employee‟s work intensity. In the case of people earning 
the  lowest  wages,  this  measure  can  reduce  the  amount  of  social  insurance  contributions 
payable by half.  
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In the following sections we study the poverty impact of tax and social security reductions for 
low wages by comparing three different policy measures, namely (1) the Work Bonus, (2) the 
Belgian Individual Tax Credit for Low Wages, and (3) the hypothetical introduction of a UK-
style Working Tax Credit. All three scenarios are set in such a way that they require the same 
overall expenditure, thus making it possible to compare their poverty impact. Their design and 
the amounts used in the simulation to attain the budget-neutrality are summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Stylized overview of the design features of the three types of measures (the Work 
Bonus (WB), the Belgian Individual Tax Credit for Low Wages (ITC) and the UK-
style Working Tax Credit (WTC), with the amounts (in €/year) used in the simulation 
to realize budget neutrality when hypothetically introduced in Belgium 2005. 
  WB  ITC   WTC  
Design       
income base  net taxable income from 
employment(1)  
net taxable income from 
employment(1)  gross total means (2) 
min. no. of hrs 
worked/week  -  -  16 or 30 
assessment unit  individual  individual  couple (3) 
Amounts (4)       
maximum amount  1,920  610  single: 2,500 
couple or parent: 5,000  
bonus for employment of 30 
or more hrs/week  -  -  1,000 
Phase-out (5)       
lower limit  18,370  15,000  8,000 
upper limit  24,260  19,500 
Depending on the 
maximum amount, max. 
23,400. 




(1) Net taxable income from employment means after deduction of professional costs and social insurance contributions.  
(2) The total means taken into account for the calculation of the tax credit include gross income from employment and self-
employment, benefit income which is taxable, pensions income, investment income and property income.  
(3) This implies that the amounts presented for WB & ITC apply on the individual level, while the amounts for the WTC 
relate to the couple unit.  
(4) These amounts are for full time equivalents. For part time workers, the maximum amounts of the WB & ITC are reduced 
according to the individual‟s work intensity. The WB measures uses the number of hours worked as criterion, the ITC the 
fraction of employment income in total taxable income.  
(5) For the comparison, only the phase-out zones are outlined. In the design of the ITC, however, is also made use of a phase-
in zone (between limits 4,500 and 6,000 €/year). 
 
The Work Bonus and the Individual Tax Credit 
Since its introduction in 2005, the Work Bonus was repeatedly extended in scope, reaching its 
highest level in 2009. It is the latter version we simulate, by „backrating‟ the 2009 amounts to 
their  comparable  level  in  2005,  using  the  harmonised  index  of  consumer  prices.  The 
budgetary  mass  thus  obtained  amounts  to  about  seven  per  cent  of  total  employee  social 17 
security contributions, a ratio that corresponds to the administrative statistics for 2009 (FOD 
Social  Security,  2010).  Figure  2  presents  the  distribution  of  the  net  gains  in  equivalent 
household income. Over the whole population (bars, left axis), the Work Bonus gain averages 
100  equivalent  Euros  per  year.  As  for  the  minimum  wage  simulation,  the  distribution  is 
characterised by an almost symmetric inverted U-shape, with the highest average gains in the 
middle deciles. With the yearly gain per beneficiary household amounting to more or less 400 
equivalent Euros per year across all deciles (increasing the beneficiary families‟ equivalent 
income from work by eight per cent on average), this shape is above all determined by the 
distribution of the eligible workers across the income distribution. The markers (right axis) 
reveal the pattern of individuals living in a family with an eligible worker. These workers are 
most frequently present in the middle deciles. Their salary is often a secondary income source 
in a household including several earners. In the highest deciles, the presence of low-paid 
workers is substantially smaller. These upper deciles are to a considerable extent populated by 
dual-earner households accumulating two salaries. In the lower deciles finally, the percentage 
of individuals living with an eligible worker is as low as in the upper deciles. Although about 
half of employees situated at the lower end of the income distribution is low-paid and eligible 
for  the  Work  Bonus,  these  deciles  are  overwhelmingly  populated  by  inactive  persons, 
resulting in low average gains.  
 
Figure 2.  Average  gain  in  equivalent  household  income  due  to  the  Work  Bonus  by  decile, 
Belgium 2005. 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of MISIM and SILC2006 
 
Next, the Individual Tax Credit for low wages is simulated in its 2005 configuration. For the 
simulation,  the  amounts  and  brackets  were  slightly  uprated  in  order  to  achieve  budget-
neutrality with the Work Bonus measure. The amounts used as well as a summary of the main 
design features can be found in Table 4. 18 
The distribution of the gains from the Individual Tax Credit is shown in Figure 3. It strongly 
peaks towards the upper middle of the income distribution, both for the averages over all 
individuals as over the beneficiary households only. A number of design features account for 
this remarkable shape. First, no account is taken of work intensity, which means that part-time 
workers  benefit  more  than  full-time  workers,  because  generally  their  total  income  from 
employment is much lower. Second, the relative amount of the Tax Credit is reduced to the 
share of employment income in a person‟s total income. This feature makes the net gain lower 
for workers in the lowest deciles, who most often combine, over the time span of a tax year, 
income from employment with a replacement income. 
 
Figure 3.  Average gain in equivalent household income due to the Individual Tax Credit for 
low activity income by decile, Belgium 2005. 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of MISIM and SILC2006. 
 
The introduction of a stylised version of the UK Working Tax Credit 
Finally, and to examine the impact of targeting low-wage tax credits at households rather than 
individuals with low earnings, we implement the UK Working Tax Credit in the Belgian 
context. In the UK, this measure is part of a tax credit package that also includes the Child 
Tax Credit. However, we focus solely on the working tax credit, thus leaving out the childcare 
component, as this is already covered by existing measures in Belgium. As outlined in Table 
4,  the  modelled  WTC  is  a  stylised  version  of  the  UK  2005  WTC
6  and differs from the 
previous measures modelled in a number of ways. First, the WTC entails a means -test based 
on a much broader income concept than the earlier discussed measures. The means -test is 
combined with an eligibility condition requiring that at least one person is working more than 
                                                 
6   The degree of detail available in the data did not allow us to model all features of the measure. The 
disability conditions and the 50+-component of the UK WTC were therefore left out in the measure 
modeled. 19 
sixteen hours/week for a household with a dependent child, or 30 hours/week for a household 
without  dependent  children.  Second,  the  maximum  amount  depends  on  the  household 
situation, and differs for singles, couples and lone parents. The means-test does not differ 
across household types, and especially for couples, the upper limit of the phase-out seems 
quite low compared to  the other two individual-based measures.  The  maximum amounts, 
however, are substantially higher in comparison, however. 
 
Furthermore, families are eligible for an additional component when at least one person works 
more than 30 hours. The amounts and brackets of the 2005 UK WTC were adapted to the 
Belgian system, using the average Euro/Pound Sterling exchange rate over the year 2005. 
Furthermore, all amounts were slightly uprated to equal the budgetary mass required by the 
two other simulated measures. Table 4 presents the exact design. 
 
The  results  of  this  exercise  are  presented  in  Figure  4.  In  comparison  to  the  other  two 
measures, the Working Tax Credit reaches more families in the lowest deciles. The gains 
correspond to a rise of their equivalent income from employment of 33 per cent on average. In 
order to keep the budget neutral in the simulation, the taper-off thresholds are quite low and 
the  withdrawal  rates  steep,  which  results  in  a  very  small  share  of  eligible  families,  in 
comparison to the other two measures. Only in the lowest decile are there more individuals 
living in a family benefiting from this measure (about twenty per cent) than in the other 
scenarios (resp. fifteen and eleven per cent). However, the strict targeting also implies that the 
benefit mainly reaches families with a work intensity at the lower side of the spectrum, as a 
low-paid full-year full-time worker earns at least €16,000 on a yearly basis.
7 Additionally, the 
steep withdrawal rate increases the risk of mobility traps. But given that the lower end of the 
household earnings distribution is so crowded, flattening the phase-out zone would come at an 
exponential rise in costs, which can only be avoided by lowering the tax credit itself, thus at 
the expense of its poverty reducing effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
7   Earning twelve months the full-time minimum wage, plus holiday payment and Christmas bonus. 20 
Figure 4.  Average gain in equivalent household income due to the UK Working Tax Credit 
implemented in Belgium 2005. 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of MISIM and SILC2006 
 
The poverty impact of the three alternatives 
As shown in Table 5, the poverty impact of the three measures is quite different, despite the 
fact that they require a similar budgetary effort. The effects are compared to a hypothetical 
pre-reform scenario, with no measure in place. The Individual Tax Credit for low activity 
income performs worst in reducing poverty. Due to its insensitivity to a number of factors 
associated with in-work poverty, such as work intensity, the tax credit is mostly subsidizing 
part-time second earners in non-poor households. Due to the upward movement of the poverty 
line, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for all persons at  active age as  well as  for children even 
increases somewhat. 
 
Only a relatively small share of working-poor families is lifted out of poverty thanks to the 
Work Bonus, which is slightly better targeted at actual low-wage employment. Given that the 
reduction is in order of 0.5 percentage points or, around 13 per cent of poor employees, the 
effect is not unimportant, but it is not large. That said, the Work Bonus does succeed in its 
primary aim of reducing inactivity traps through generating higher net incomes for low-paid 
work. But the poverty impact is limited. Because of the weak overlap between low-paid work 
and household poverty, the potential impact of any measure that targets low-paid workers 
rather than households with low (combined) earnings, is intrinsically limited at any rate.  
 
The implementation of a stylised version of the UK Working Tax Credit is in this respect 
especially  interesting.  The  at-risk-of-poverty  rate  for  employees  drops  by  almost  one 
percentage point, and at the same time the poverty rate for the whole population of active age, 21 
as well as for children, diminishes. With the given budget, this measure has the most efficient 
poverty  reduction  capacity.  Its  reach,  however,  remains  too  small  to  eliminate  in-work 
poverty, at least within the budgetary constraints we impose for the purpose of making the 
simulated policy alternatives comparable.  
 
Table 5.  Poverty impact of the Work Bonus (WB), the Individual Tax Credit for low activity 
income (ITC), and the UK Working Tax Credit (WTC) implemented in Belgium, 
2005  (Poverty  line  at  60  %  of  median  equivalent  income,  recalculated  for  each 
scenario) 
  Pre-reform  with WB  with ITC  with WTC 
Poverty line (expressed as a % 
of baseline)  100  101  101  101 
All individuals at active age  12.54  12.53  12.78  11.69 
Employees         
all  3.48  3.02  3.39  2.55 
full time  3.04  2.59  2.98  2.02 
part time  5.15  4.62  4.94  4.63 
full time 12 months  1.56  1.37  1.51  1.19 
Children  15.19  15.24  15.29  13.67 
Note: Employees are defined as those whose main activity status was „in work‟ (full time or part time) for at least one month 
during the reference year and who earned a strictly positive income from employment, excluding self-employment. Full-time 
employees are those who have spent at least one month in full-time employment during the reference year and a larger 
number of months full-time than part-time, part-time employees have worked at least one month in part-time employment 
and a larger number of months part-time than full-time. Children are defined as all individuals aged 16 or younger. 




We have demonstrated that, at least in Belgium, even substantially higher minimum wages 
would have a limited impact on in-work poverty, and at the cost of rises in labour costs and 
significant  spill-overs  to  households  in  the  middle  and  upper  regions  of  the  income 
distribution.  Moreover,  given  that  in  the  recent  past  median  living  standards  and  hence 
relative poverty thresholds have been pushed up, not only by rising wages but also by the 
proliferation of dual earnership, the increases in minimum wages required to keep workers 
solely relying on it above the poverty threshold are by now so substantial that they are hardly 
conceivable.  Yet  minimum  wages  still  constitute  the  foundation  of  minimum  income 
protection for workers. They do not have a budgetary cost, as long they do not destroy jobs 
and cause people to become dependent on benefits. There is no hard empirical evidence that 
this is the case at currently prevailing levels but such effects cannot be excluded at the levels 
we have simulated. Minimum wages do increase the consumer cost of certain products or 
services, but here it is useful to keep in mind that often this entails a redistribution between 22 
relatively  highly  paid  consumers  of  services  to  relatively  lower-paid  providers  (Freeman, 
1996).  Moreover,  in  an  encompassing  anti-poverty  strategy,  minimum  wages  can  play  a 
crucial  role  in  dampening  the  possible  wage  erosion  effects  of  in-work  benefits  and  tax 
credits. This points to the importance of maintaining minimum wages and making sure that 
these keep pace with average wage growth. 
 
Reduced social security contributions and well-targeted individual tax credits increase the net 
pay of low-paid workers, but since most of them do not live in a household with a combined 
disposable income below the poverty line, the impact on poverty is again very limited. There 
are other considerations. A further shift from proportional to progressive contributions clashes 
with the insurance rationale of the Bismarckian systems prevalent in Continental Europe. This 
implies that the approach of reducing employees‟ contributions and deviating further from the 
equivalence principle has its limits. 
 
The fundamental problem with both policy options from a poverty reduction viewpoint is that 
they are targeted at low-paid workers, not households with insufficient combined earnings. 
What then about tax relief for households rather than individuals on low earnings? As we 
have demonstrated for Belgium, in order to be effective as an anti-poverty device, such tax 
measures need to be strongly targeted. But strong targeting at households with low earnings is 
bound to create mobility traps. These can be avoided if taper-off rates are sufficiently flat, but 
that comes at a very considerable cost given that the lower end of the household earnings 
distribution is so densely populated in most Continental European countries. This cost can 
only be avoided by making the amount of the tax credit itself smaller, but in that case the anti-
poverty effect is reduced. In addition, from the perspective of horizontal equity and public 
support for the system, there are probably limits to strongly targeted tax measures.  
 
Finally, there are policy options that do not seek to target specific segments among the poor. 
Universal child benefits, for example, have an immediate impact on poverty – both among 
those  who  depend  on  earnings  and  those  on  replacement  benefits  –  without  adversely 
affecting work incentives. This is important given that there is a very significant overlap 
between child poverty and in-work poverty. Corak et al. (2005) show that the best performing 
countries in terms of poverty reduction tend to have systems of universal child benefits and 
tax concessions that are not particularly strongly targeted at low-income children. Yet within 
universal  systems  there  still  is  scope  for  targeting  resources  proportionally  more  at  the 
poorest. Together with policies that facilitate and support dual earnership, particularly the 
employment of carers, such universal benefits are bound to constitute a key component of any 
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